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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of U tab 
RALPH E. CHILD, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUS-
TRIAL COMMISSION OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 
8873 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On January 16, 1958, the representative of the Department 
of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission of Utah 
issued a written decision denying benefits to Ralph E. Child 
on the grounds that the said Ralph E. Child is President of 
the Ralph Child Construction Company and was not unem-
ployed. 
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On January 20, 1958, the appellant, Ralph E. Child, filed 
a written appeal (Tr. 9). The matter was referred to the 
Appeals Referee on January 27, 1958 (Tr. 10). After due 
notice (Tr. 11) an appeal hearing was held by the Referee 
at Provo, Utah, on February 6, 1958. The Referee on February 
10, 1958, affirmed the decision of the Department of Em-
ployment Security representative. 
On February 20, 1958, the appellant, Ralph E. Child, ap-
pealed the Referee's decision to the Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah. On March 28, 1958, the Board 
of Review affirmed the decision of the Referee (Tr. 44). 
The appellant, Ralph E. Child, on April 15, 1958, appealed 
the decision of the Board of Review to the Supreme Court 
of Utah (Tr. 45, 46). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Prior to 1956 and for some 20 odd years the appellant had 
been self-employed. On or about April 1, 1956, the operations 
of the appellant were incorporated into four separate corpora-
tions. Since that time, the appellant, Ralph E. Child, has 
occupied relatively the same position (i.e. President and Man-
ager and operating head holding a majority control) in the 
following companies: Ralph Child Construction Company, 
Southeast Service, Cold Spirng Construction Company, and the 
Arcee Equipment Company (Tr. 14, 15, 19, 20). 
Southeast Service is engaged in service station operations 
and hires service station attendants (Tr. 20). 
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The Cold Spring Construction Company is primarily en-
gaged in holding and operating rental property under the year-
round direction of the appellant as President ( T r. 19) . 
The Arcee Equipment Company owns, among other things, 
caterpillar tractors, trucks, cement mixers, power shovels, 
lathes, welders, saws, etc. (Tr. 23). Its business is primarily 
that of leasing equipment to the Ralph Child Construction 
Company and others (Tr. 23). The appellant as President 
and Manager directs its activities on a year-round basis. 
The Ralph Child Construction Company engages in the 
construction of buildings (schools and otherwise), canals, 
sewers, bridges, and in the process of leveling land for farmers 
and others (Tr. 16). These of course are done pursuant to 
contracts which in many cases are obtained by bids. The 
affairs of the company are directed on a year-round basis by 
the appellant as President and Manager at a stipulated salary 
of $165.00 per week (Tr. 16). 
On or about December 1, 1957, the Ralph Child Con-
struction Company had no jobs in active progress and at that 
time the appellant, Ralph E. Child, "laid himself off" as 
"Manager" (Tr. 16) continuing as President without drawing 
the stipulated salary of $165.00 per week (Tr. 18). The 
record does not indicate that the Board of Directors took any 
action with reference to this salary question. 
There is no evidence in the record to show that the appel-
lant received any cash salary from the other three companies 
which he managed as President and Manager, at least during 
the period covered by the appellant's claims for unemployment 
compensation benefits. 
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After December 1, 1957, the appellant continued to 
manage the affairs of the four companies: the service station 
operations; the rental operations; the equipment operations; 
and the construction affairs, making collections and bank de-
posits (Tr. 18), contacting architects and examining bid 
proposals in trade magazines (Tr. 21), negotiating with the 
Small Business Administration for a loan or loans of money 
to support the bonds which were necessary to meet the require-
ments of contracts (Tr. 22), directing the work of an auditor 
engaged in preparing a combined statement for the several 
companies which would support the loan request, supervising 
the work of one Jane Diamond and the service station attend-
ants ( T r. 2 3) , directing the preparation and filing of tax 
returns (Tr. 24), making the decisions with reference to repair 
of equipment and directing the negotiating for the repair 
of same (Tr. 24), paying bills and signing checks (Tr. 24), 
expending time in an effort to rent equipment and obtain new 
business for the Ralph Child Construction Company (Tr. 25), 
and generally doing all of those day-to-day things necessary in 
the management and control of the operations of the four 
companies (Tr. 25). 
It appears from the transcript that the business of the 
Southeast Service (service station operations) is integrated 
with the operations of the Ralph Child Construction Company, 
at least to the extent that Southeast Service monies are deposited 
in the bank account of the Ralph Child Construction Company; 
and the Southeast Service bills and expenditures are paid from 
the bank account, at least as to the salaries of the Southeast 
Service employees. Southeast Service employees are considered 
for the purpose of tax reports (particularly the unemployment 
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compensation contribution report filed with the Department 
of Employment Security) to be employees of the Ralph Child 
Construction Company (Tr. 20, 23). The number of employees 
reported by the Ralph Child Construction Company on its 
contribution report for the fourth quarter of 195 7 ranges from 
a minimum of five employees to a maximum of ten employees 
(Tr. 20). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
I. THE APPELLANT, RALPH E. CHILD, WAS NOT 
UNEMPLOYED AND ELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECUR-
ITY ACT. SECTIONS 35-4-3 AND 35-4-22(m) UCA 1953. 
II. THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION AND THE 
BOARD OF REVIEW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT'S REVIE\V IS CON-
FINED TO THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THOSE 
FINDINGS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPELLANT, RALPH E. CHILD, WAS NOT 
UNEMPLOYED AND ELIGIBLE FOR BENEFITS WITHIN 
THE MEANING OF THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECUR-
ITY ACT. SECTIONS 35-4-3 AND 35-4-22(m) UCA 1953. 
The issue in this case revolves around the question as to 
whether or not the appellant during the period in which he was 
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filing claims for unemployment compensation benefits was 
"unemployed" within the meaning of the Employment Security 
Act. 
Section 3 5-4-22 (j) ( 1) defines employment as follows: 
" 'Employment' means any service performed prior 
to January 1, 1941, which was employment as defined 
in the Utah Unemployment Compensation Law prior 
to the effective date of this act, and subject to the 
other provisions of this subsection, service performed 
after December 31, 1940, including service in inter-
state commerce, and service as an officer of a corpora-
tion performed for wages or under any contract of hire 
written or oral, express or implied." (Italics ours.) 
Since the claimant was, during the period in question, 
President of the several corporations, his relationship as 
defined by the foregoing section was an "employment" relation-
ship within the meaning of the Act. We are, therefore, con-
cerned with the question as to whether or not the claimant 
could be considered to be "unemployed" for the purpose of 
drawing unemployment compensation benefits. 
Section 35-4-4 UCA 1953 provides: 
"An unemployed individual shall be eligible to re-
ceive benefits with respect to any week only if it has 
been found by the Commission that: (Italics ours) 
· · (a) He has made a claim for benefits with 
respect to such week . . . 
"(b) He has registered for work . 
" (c) He is able to work and is available for 
work.'' 
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When an individual files a claim for unemployment com-
pensation benefits, the Commission or its authorized repre-
sentatives must first determine, therefore, whether the indi-
vidual is unemployed within the meaning of the Act. 
Section 35-4-22 ( m) defines unemployment as follows: 
" 'Unemployment.' ( 1) An individual shall be 
deemed 'unemployed' in any week during which he 
performs no services and with respect to which no 
wages are payable to him, or in any week of less than 
full-time work if the wages payable to him with re-
spect to such week are less than his weekly benefit 
amount. The Commission shall prescribe regulations 
applicable to unemployed individuals making such 
distinctions in the procedure as to total unemployment, 
part total unemployment, partial unemployment of 
individuals attached to their regular jobs, and other 
forms of short-time work, as the Commission deems 
necessary.'' 
The claimant was performing services for the Ralph Child 
Construction Company and the other three companies; there-
fore the question which confronted the Commission repre-
sentative was that of determining whether or not Child, the 
appellant, was fully employed within the meaning of the fore-
going section. 
We think that the Commission representative and the 
appeals bodies correctly found that the appellant was fully 
employed on a year-round basis by the corporations which 
engaged his services as President and operating head. The 
fact that Child chose to "lay himself off" as Manager without 
salary during the period of the year when the Ralph Child 
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Construction Company was not actively engaged in fulfilling 
job contracts did not make him any less fully employed. 
In the first place, the act of Child in laying himself off 
without the Board of Directors taking any action did not 
relieve the corporation from the legal ability of paying the 
appellant's salary of $165.00 per week. In the second place, 
the appellant's duties as President and operating head of the 
four companies in which he held the majority of stock control 
did not end with the completion of the active contracts of 
the Ralph Child Construction Company. 
The success or failure of the construction company is 
dependent almost entirely on the appellant in that it is his 
responsibility alone to obtain new contracts for the ensuing 
construction season and to do all of those things necessary 
to keep the affairs of the company in operating condition. 
During the period for which he claims benefits, Child was 
making the necessary collections and bank deposits, tax re-
turns, etc.; signing the necessary checks in payment of expenses; 
and spending a substantial part of his time doing those things 
required to obtain a loan which would enable the corporation 
to furnish the bonds necessary in the performance of most 
construction contracts. 
The services which were performed for all of the four 
companies were accounted for and paid by the Ralph Child 
Construction Company. This included the services and wages 
of the individuals engaged in performing the work at the 
Southeast Service operations. The Southeast Service operations 
are service station operations which continue on a year-round 
10 
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basis and are directed and supervised by the appellant in this 
case. 
The appellant also directed the work of one Jane Diamond, 
who, it appears from the record, did the general stenographic 
and day-to-day bookkeeping work of the several companies. 
The appellant testified that he alone was responsible for 
the job of renting the equipment of the Arcee Construction 
Company and directing the affairs of the Cold Spring Con-
struction Company. 
It may well be that the appellant, Child, did not during 
the off-season period for the Ralph Child Construction Com-
pany have to maintain specific working hours. There is, how-
ever, no doubt that the appellant was required to be available 
during ordinary working hours to give directions and to make 
decisions with reference to the operations of the four com-
panies. 
So long as Child remained the operating head of the 
several companies charged with the responsibilities for all of 
the company operations, he could not have been anything 
but fully employed; and the representative and the Board of 
Review could not logically have concluded otherwise. 
We have examined all of the benefit decisions of the 48 
states and the territories which deal with the problem of 
whether or not a managing officer of a corporation could 
become unemployed during the tenure of office for which he 
is required to perform management services, and we find very 
few cases in point. 
11 
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There is one State Supreme Court case which decides 
the issue involved herein. This is a New York case reported 
in CCH at N.Y., Paragraph 8849, in the Matter of the Claim 
for Benefits under Article 18 of the Labor Law made by Viola 
Brown, Respondent. Edward Corsi, as Industrial Commissioner, 
Appellant. It involves a denial of benefits to a woman, age 
70, who was Secretary of a family corporation, performing 
services without compensation because of the financial con-
dition of the corporation, and was decided on the grounds 
that it was not shown that she was available for work or that 
she was totally unemployed. 
The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Judicial 
Department, on March 18, 1953, said: 
"Claimant was a woman seventy years of age. Her 
son, her husband and herself were officers of a corpor-
ation known as the Federal Broadcasting System, Inc., 
which operated a radio station in Rochester, New York. 
Claimant was secretary of the corporation, her husband 
was treasurer, and their son was president. The latter 
owned all of the stock. The corporation was a family 
affair and the amount of salaries paid to the corporate 
officers depended on the profits in any given year. 
These amounts were determined solely by the son, who 
was the president and sole owner of the stock. At 
the close of the business year 1950 it was determined 
that the financial affairs of the corporation did not 
warrant payment of any salary to claimant. 
"The issues presented upon appeal are whether 
claimant, as a corporate officer performing services with-
out compensation because of the financial condition of 
the corporation, was totally unemployed within the 
meaning of the statute, and whether she was available 
for employment within the meaning of the same 
12 
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statute. We think there is no substantial evidence in 
the record to sustain the determination that claimant 
was available for employment and, therefore, eligible 
for benefits and hence that such a decision was erro-
neous as a matter of law. We also think that the record 
fails to furnish any substantial proof to sustain a finding 
that claimant was totally unemployed." 
The Board of Review of the State of Maryland as reported 
in CCH, Paragraph 1338, concluded that: 
"An officer of a corporation cannot be partially un-
employed so long as he holds an office since the assump-
tion of office presupposes acceptance of the obligation 
to perform any services necessary in such office in the 
interest of the corporation during the term of office." 
In the instant case, the appellant as majority stockholder 
accepted the obligation and responsibility for carrying on the 
affairs of the several companies. The fact that because of the 
condition of the finances of the companies he chose to quit 
drawing his $165.00 per week does not mean that his full-
time obligation of management became any less. 
The entire record shows that there was no abandonment 
of business by any of the companies; and, to the contrary, that 
each of the companies was doing business on a year-round 
basis to the extent that business was available. 
This case bears no similarity to the case of the part-time 
employee who because of seasonality or other factors has 
been reduced from full-time hours to several hours per day 
or several days per week. 
for the purposes of determining whether or not an indi-
vidual is unemployed (see definition of unemployment supra) 
13 
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the Commission must examine the facts to see whether he is 
performing services less than full time. If he is performing 
services full time under his contract of hire, as was the appellant 
in this case, then it is immaterial whether or not he receives 
payment for those services. On the other hand, if he works 
less than his customary full-time hours and earns less than 
his weekly benefit amount, he would be consiaered partially 
unemployed. 
Commission salesmen, for example, who are engaged to 
spend their full time in the work of selling are not unemployed 
during those weeks in which they earn no commissions or earn 
commissions in the amount less than their weekly benefit 
amount. There is a great similarity between the commission 
salesman when he works several months before he makes a sale 
and then sees his efforts result in commissions which amply 
pay him for the time during which he was not receiving re-
muneration and the claimant who was necessarily required 
to do many things during the period of time when the income 
to the corporations was small. 
The efforts of the appellant during the months in which 
no active job contract performance was being carried out 
could very well yield all of the business for the operating 
season; and, therefore, be the reason for the success or failure 
of the company on a year-round basis. 
So long as the appellant remains President of the several 
companies with full management obligations and responsi-
bilities, it is not possible for him to have any week of less than 
full-time work. The Commission and the Board of Review 
14 
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correctly found that the appellant was not "unemployed" 
within the meaning of the Act. 
POINT II 
THE FINDINGS OF THE COMMISSION AND THE 
BOARD OF REVIEW ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTAN-
TIAL EVIDENCE, AND THE COURT'S REVIEW IS CON-
FINED TO THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THOSE 
FINDINGS. 
Section 35-5-5 UCA 1953 provides that an unemployed 
individual shall be eligible to receive benefits with respect to 
any week only if it has been found by the Commission that 
he is unemployed, has registered for work, is able and available 
for work, etc., thereby making the Commission the exclusive 
trier of facts regarding all claims for unemployment com-
pensation benefits. 
Section 35-4-10(i) of the Act provides: 
" ... in any judicial proceedings under this Section, 
the findings of the Commission and the Board of Re-
view as to the facts as supported by evidence shall 
be conclusive and the jurisdiction of said Court 
shall be confined to questions of law ... " 
The Commission, therefore, is charged with the duties 
of being the fact-finding body, and the jurisdiction of this 
Court is limited to a revievv of the application of the law to 
those facts. 
In the case of Walton vs. Wilhelm, 120 Ind. App., 93 
N.E. 2d 373, the Court said: 
15 
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''The duty to determine the facts has been delegated 
to the Board. The realistic interpretation of the facts 
and circumstances in evidence is absolutely essential 
to the successful operation of the plan . . . . In its 
search for the truth, the Board has the rights to con-
sider the interest of the witness; the probability or 
improbability of his insertions in the light of proved 
or admitted facts; the general situation as shown by 
all of the surrounding circumstances; the conditions 
or compulsion under which the witness acted and under 
which he testified; his prejudices, if any; his desires; 
his apparent forthrightness or lack thereof; and many 
other factors. 
"Haynes vs. Brown, Ind. App. 1949, 88 N.E. 2d 795. 
It is impossible to draw a clear line of defense between 
availability and unavailability. If the evidence pro-
duced by a claimant leaves the Board unconvinced of 
the justice of his claim or convinces the Board that he 
is not one of those who come within the true spirit 
and purpose of the Act and the evidence is not such 
that reasonable men would be bound to reach a dif-
ferent result, we are not at liberty to disturb a finding 
against the claimant on the question of availability." 
In the case of Haynes vs. Unemployment Compensation 
Commission, et al, Mo. 183 S.W. 2d 77, the Court in discussing 
the delegation of powers to the Commission or Board stated: 
''An unemployed individual is eligible to receive 
benefits only if the Commission finds that the required 
conditions have been met. The claimant assumes the 
risk of non-persuasion and we think the general rule 
applicable to ordinary court proceedings applies. 
"In any judicial proceedings under this Section the 
findings of the Commission as to the facts, if supported 
by competent and substantial evidence and in the 
absence of fraud, shall be conclusive and the juris-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
diction of said court shall be confined to questions of 
law. See S. S. Kresgee Company vs. Unemployment 
Compensation Commission, 348 Mo. 147, 152 S.W. 
2d 184, 186. In a case of this character, a finding by 
the Commission that respondent was not 'available for 
work' and denying her claim for benefits on the ground 
she was ineligible for such benefits need not be sup-
ported by affirmative substantial evidence tending to 
show she was not available for work, because the 
burden was on her, as claimant, to show prima facie 
that she was entitled to the benefits claimed. See Block 
vs. Kinder, 338 Mo. 1099, 93 S.W. 2d 932; Conley 
vs. Crown Coach Company, 348 Mo. 1243, 159 S.W. 
2d 281, 283." 
This Court in the case of Bessie Alvord vs. Board of Re-
view of The Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of 
Employment Security, 1 Ut. 2d 388, 267 P. 2d 914, said: 
"The written admission of April 21, together with 
the testimony taken at the hearing was, as a whole, 
reasonably susceptible of the construction placed there-
on, that her availability for work was limited, and 
that because of her household duties she did not desire 
work other than part-time during said period for which 
she was paid. The finding on her non-availability was 
a finding of fact and the construction of the admission 
was properly made in connection therewith. Title 35-
4-19 (i) Utah Code Annotated 1953, provides for an 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the Board 
of Review, but it limits the jurisdiction of this court as 
follows: (Italics ours) 
'ln any judicial proceeding under this section, the 
findings of the Commission and the Board of Review 
as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be 
conclusive and the jurisdiction of the said court 
shall be confined to questions of law.' 
17 
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"We are of the opmmn that the issues involved 
were issues of fact, well supported by the evidence, and 
that the decision of the Board of Review was con-
clusive thereon." 
In the instant case, the Commission has determined the 
question of the claimant's "unemployment" from a consider-
ation of facts which are not in dispute. The appellant, Ralph 
E. Child, as President and Manager on a year-to-year basis 
for each of the four companies, had the duty and responsibility 
of doing all of those things connected with management and 
operations. The fact that he as President and Manager deter-
mined that the financial conditions of the companies indicated 
that he should not draw a salary starting on or about December 
1 did not in any way affect those duties and responsibilities. 
By their very nature each of the four companies demanded 
and required attention and management during 12 months 
of each year. 
As we pointed out earlier, it is absolutely essential to 
the successful and profitable operation of a construction busi-
ness that the management of that business be constantly en-
gaged in the performance of existing contracts; and when 
there are no active contracts being performed, that he be 
engaged in the business of doing all of those things necessary to 
the obtaining of new contracts. 
The fact that there is a seasonality factor which limits the 
performance of construction contracts during the cold months 
of the year does not leave the appellant as President and 
Manager with no work or obligations during those cold 
months. The Commission representatives reasonably found 
that the claimant was fully employed on a year-round basis 
18 
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and was not unemployed at the time he filed his claim for 
unemployment compensation benefits. 
The Commission's findings are supported by the weight 
of the evidence, and we submit that no reasonable person 
confronted with the same facts would have found otherwise. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the Industrial Commission respectfully 
submits that the appellant in this action was not unemployed 
during the period for which he claims unemployment com-
pensation benefits, and that the findings of fact of the Com-
mission are conclusive and that the jurisdiction of this Court 
is confined to questions of law and that, therefore, the decision 
of the Commission and the Board of Review should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
19 
E. R. CALLISTER, 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN, 
Special Assistant 
Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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